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Abstract
Bell’s Theorem from 1964 and the (Strong) Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen
from 2009 both exclude deterministic hidden variable theories (or, in modern parlance,
‘ontological models’) that are compatible with some small fragment of quantum me-
chanics, admit ‘free’ settings of the archetypal Alice&Bob experiment, and satisfy a
locality condition akin to Parameter Independence. We clarify the relationship be-
tween these theorems by giving reformulations of both that exactly pinpoint their
resemblance and their differences. Our reformulation imposes determinism in what
we see as the only consistent way, in which the ‘ontological state’ initially determines
both the settings and the outcome of the experiment. The usual status of the settings
as ‘free’ parameters is subsequently recovered from independence assumptions on the
pertinent (random) variables. Our reformulation also clarifies the role of the settings
in Bell’s later generalization of his theorem to stochastic hidden variable theories.
1 Introduction
Though not really new,1 the (Strong) Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen [13, 14]
is one of the sharpest and most interesting results that give constraints on determinism. It
does so by proving that determinism is incompatible with a number of a priori desirable
assumptions, including a small fragment of quantum mechanics (viz. the theory of two
epr-correlated spin-one particles), the free choice of settings of an epr-style bipartite
experiment involving such particles, and a locality condition called min. The latter has a
long pedigree, arguably going back to epr, but it was first stated quite clearly by Bell:2
‘The vital assumption is that the result B for particle 2 does not depend
on the setting ~a of the magnet for particle 1, nor A on ~b.’ [3, p. 196].
∗Dedicated to Professor Hans Maassen, on the occasion of his inaugural lecture (15-01-2014).
1Analogous earlier results were obtained, in chronological order, by Heywood & Redhead [20], Stairs
[34], Brown & Svetlichny [7], and Clifton [11] (of which only [20] was cited by Conway and Kochen).
2Bell [3] even attributes it to Einstein. See [37] for a detailed analysis of the way this condition is
actually used by Bell in [3, 5], and of the way it has been (mis)perceived by others. In particular, one
should distinguish it from the locality condition usually named after Bell [6]. The latter, also called
local causality, is a conjunction of two (probabilistic) notions that are now generally called Parameter
Independence (pi) and Outcome Independence (oi); see [8, 22, 23, 27, 32, 33]. The latter is automatically
satisfied in the type of deterministic theories studied in [3, 13, 14], upon which the former reduces to the
condition stated in the main text above, but now conditioned on certain values of the hidden variables.
Note that our definition of the term pi will be different from the literature so far, though in the same spirit.
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In any case, also a closer study shows that Bell’s (1964) Theorem on deterministic hidden
variable theories and the (Strong) Free Will Theorem appear to achieve a very similar
(if not identical) goal under strikingly similar assumptions, which prompts the question
what exactly their mutual relationship is. Curiously, despite the stellar fame of Bell’s 1964
paper (which according to Google Scholar had about 8500 citations as of May 2014) and
the considerable attention that also the Free Will Theorem has received (e.g., [16, 21]), as
far as we are aware, there has been little research in this precise direction.3
Hence the main aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between Bell’s 1964
Theorem and the Free Will Theorem. But in doing so, we will en passant attempt to resolve
an issue that has troubled Bell as well as Conway and Kochen, namely the theoretical
status of parameter settings. As pointed out by Conway and Kochen themselves [14], it
is odd to assume determinism for the physical system under consideration but not for the
experimenters, so that the contradiction that proves their theorem seems almost circular.4
In Bell’s later work, there has been a similar tension between the idea that the hidden
variables (in the pertinent causal past) should on the one hand include all ontological
information relevant to the experiment, but on the other hand should leave Alice and
Bob free to choose any settings they like; see especially [29, 35] for a fine analysis of Bell’s
dilemma (by some of his greatest supporters).5 We will show that in both contexts of Bells’
Theorem (i.e. either deterministic or stochastic) this issue can be resolved in a straight-
forward way by initially including the settings among the random variables describing the
experiment, after which they are ‘liberated’ by suitable independence assumptions.6
The plan of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a version of Bell’s original
(1964) theorem [3] that addresses the above issues. As a warm-up for what is to come, in
Section 3 we extend this version to the spin-one case, followed in Section 4 by a reformu-
lation of the Strong Free Will Theorem [14] in the same spirit. Our final Section 5 goes
beyond our primary goal of finding constraints on determinism, but has been included in
order to show that our treatment of parameter settings through random variables also ap-
plies to Bell’s later results on stochastic hidden variable theories [6, 8, 10, 15, 22, 27, 32, 37].
Our conclusion is that the Strong Free Will Theorem uses fewer assumptions than Bell’s
1964 Theorem, as no appeal to probability theory is made. This comes at a price, though.
First, in the absence of an Aspect-type experiment using spin-one particles, the former
so far lacks the experimental backing of the latter. Second, because of its dependence on
the Kochen–Specker Theorem, the Strong Free Will Theorem might lack finite precision
robustness, cf. [1, 2, 18], though this threat recently seems to have been obviated [19].
3The only significant exception we could find is the small and otherwise interesting book by Hemmick
and Shakur [17], whose scathing treatment of the Free Will Theorem is somewhat undermined by their
claim (p. 90) that the assumption of determinism follows from the other assumptions in the Strong Free
Will Theorem (notably pi and perfect correlation). This seems questionable [37]: either Bell’s (later)
locality condition (i.e., pi plus oi) in conjunction with perfect correlation implies determinism, or pi plus
determinism implies oi (and hence Bell Locality). Perhaps our view (which is certainly shared by Conway
and Kochen!) that the assumptions of the Strong Free Will Theorem have been chosen quite carefully is
clearer from our reformulation below than from even their second paper [14] (not to speak of their first
[13]). Indeed, if valid, the objection of Hemmick and Shakur could just as well be raised against Bell’s 1964
Theorem, where it would be equally misguided if both results are construed as attempts to put constraints
on determinism in the first place. Our treatment of parameter settings will also be different from [17].
4This even led them to their curious way of paraphrasing their theorem as showing that ‘If we humans
have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity’.
5See also [6, 10] and most recently [26] for the interpretation of hidden variables as ontological states.
6See also Colbeck and Renner [12] for at least the first step of this strategy in the context of stochastic
hidden variable theories. Using settings as labels, on the other hand, is defended in e.g. [8, 10, 35].
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2 Bell’s (1964) Theorem revisited
The setting of Bell’s Theorem in its simplest form is given by the usual epr-Bohm exper-
iment (with photons) [8], in which Alice and Bob each choose a setting A = α ∈ XA and
B = β ∈ XB , respectively, where XA and XB are finite sets whose elements are angles in
[0, π). For the theorem, it is even enough to assume XA = {α1, α2} and XB = {β1, β2},
for suitable αi and βj (see below). Alice and Bob each receive one photon from an epr-
correlated pair, and determine whether or not it passes through a polarizer whose principal
axis is set at an angle α or β relative to some reference axis in the plane orthogonal to the
direction of motion of the photon pair.7 If Alice’s photon passes through she writes down
F = 1|A = α, and if not she writes F = 0|A = α. Likewise, Bob records his result as
G = 1|B = β or G = 0|B = β. Repeating this experiment, they determine empirical prob-
abilities PE for all possible outcomes through the frequency interpretation of probabilities,
which they denote by PE(F = λ|A = α) and PE(F = µ|B = β), or, having got together
and compared their results, by PE(F = λ,G = µ|A = α,B = β), where λ, µ ∈ {0, 1}.
If the photon pair is prepared in the epr-correlated state |ψepr〉 = (|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉)/
√
2
(taking into account helicity only), they find (as confirmed by quantum mechanics):8
PE(F 6= G|A = α,B = β) = sin2(α− β). (2.1)
The question, then, is whether these probabilities are ‘intrinsic’ or ‘irreducible’, as
claimed by mainstream quantum mechanics, or instead are just a consequence of our
ignorance. To make this precise, we define the latter case, i.e. determinism, at least in our
present context, adding the other assumptions of Bell’s (1964) Theorem along the way.
Definition 2.1 In the context of the epr-Bohm experiment (with photons):
• Determinism means that there is a state space X with associated functions
A : X → XA, B : X → XB , F : X → {0, 1}, G : X → {0, 1}, (2.2)
which completely describe the experiment in the sense that some state x ∈ X deter-
mines both its settings α = A(x), β = B(x) and its outcome λ = F (x), µ = G(x).
• Probability Theory means that the above set X can be upgraded to a probability
space (X,Σ, P ), carrying the above functions A,B,F,G as random variables,9 so that
the empirical probabilities are reproduced as conditional joint probabilities through10
PE(F = λ,G = µ|A = α,B = β) = P (F = λ,G = µ|A = α,B = β). (2.3)
Furthermore, in terms of a postulated additional random variable Z : X → XZ :
• Parameter Independence means that F = F (A,Z) and G = G(B,Z), in that
there are measurable functions Fˆ : XA×XZ → {0, 1} and Gˆ : XB×XZ → {0, 1} for
which F (x) = Fˆ (A(x), Z(x)) and G(x) = Gˆ(B(x), Z(x)) (P -almost everywhere).
• Freedom means that (A,B,Z) are probabilistically independent relative to P .11
7Equivalently, α and β could stand for the corresponding unit vectors ~a and ~b, defined up to a sign.
8 Here PE(F 6= G|A = α,B = β) ≡ PE(F = 0, G = 1|A = α,B = β)+PE(F = 1, G = 0|A = α,B = β).
The complete statistics are: PE(F = 1, G = 1|A = α,B = β) = PE(F = 0, G = 0|A = α,B = β) =
1
2
cos2(α− β) and PE(F = 0, G = 1|A = α,B = β) = PE(F = 1, G = 0|A = α,B = β) =
1
2
sin2(α− β).
9This formulation incorporates the assumption that P is independent of A,B, F,G, and vice versa.
10Here P (F = λ,G = µ|A = α,B = β) ≡ P (F = λ,G = µ, A = α,B = β)/P (A = α,B = β) and
P (F = λ,G = µ,A = α,B = β) ≡ P ({x ∈ X | F (x) = λ,G(x) = µ,A(x) = α,B(x) = β}), etc.
11On the usual definition, this also implies that the pairs (A,B), (A,Z), and (B,Z) are independent.
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Here Z is the traditional ‘hidden variable’ space that, in the spirit of Bell [6, 29, 35], carries
exactly the ‘ontological’ information (including e.g. the photon variables) that is:
i) sufficiently complete for the outcome of the experiment to depend on (A,B,Z) alone;
ii) independent of the settings (A,B), in the pertinent probabilistic sense.
These conditions stand (or fall) together: without ii), i.e., Freedom, one could take XZ = X
and Z = id, whereas without i), XZ could be a singleton. Parameter Independence in fact
sharpens i), which a priori might have been F = F (A,B,Z) and G = G(A,B,Z), to the
effect that Alice’s outcome is independent of Bob’s, given A and Z (and vice versa) [3].
Our reformulation of Bell’s (1964) Theorem, then, is as follows.
Theorem 2.2 Determinism, Probability Theory, Parameter Independence, Freedom, and
Nature (i.e. the outcome (2.1) of the epr-Bohm experiment) are contradictory.
Proof. Determinism, Probability Theory, and Parameter Independence imply12
P (F = λ,G = µ|A = α,B = β) = PABZ(Fˆ = λ, Gˆ = µ|Aˆ = α, Bˆ = β), (2.4)
where the function Aˆ : XA × XB ×XZ → XA is just projection on the first coordinate,
likewise the function Bˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → XB is projection on the second, and PABZ is
the joint probability on XA×XB×XZ induced by the triple (A,B,Z) and the probability
measure P . Similarly, let PZ be the probability on XZ defined by Z and P , and define
the following random variables on the probability space (XZ ,ΣZ , PZ):
Fˆα(z) := Fˆ (α, z); (2.5)
Gˆβ(z) := Gˆ(β, z). (2.6)
Freedom then implies (indeed, is equivalent to the fact) that PABZ is given by a product
measure on XA ×XB ×XZ (cf. [24, Lemma 3.10]). A brief computation then yields
PABZ(Fˆ = λ, Gˆ = µ|Aˆ = α, Bˆ = β) = PZ(Fˆα = λ, Gˆβ = µ), (2.7)
and hence, from (2.4),
P (F = λ,G = µ|A = α,B = β) = PZ(Fˆα = λ, Gˆβ = µ). (2.8)
Adding the Nature assumption, i.e. (2.1), then gives the crucial result
PZ(Fˆα 6= Gˆβ) = sin2(α− β). (2.9)
However, any four {0, 1}-valued random variables must satisfy the (‘Boole’) inequality [31]
PZ(Fˆα1 6= Gˆβ1) ≤ PZ(Fˆα1 6= Gˆβ2) + PZ(Fˆα2 6= Gˆβ1) + PZ(Fˆα2 6= Gˆβ2), (2.10)
which can be proved directly from the axioms of (classical) probability theory. But for
suitable values of (α1, α2, β1, β2) this inequality is violated by (2.9). Take, for example,
α2 = β2 = 3θ, α1 = 0, and β1 = θ. The inequality (2.10) then assumes the form f(θ) ≥ 0
for f(θ) = sin2(3θ)+sin2(2θ)−sin2(θ). But this is false for many values of θ ∈ [0, 2π]. 
As already mentioned, in the usual treatment of Bell’s Theorem (either his determinis-
tic version [3, 8] or his stochastic version [6, 8, 10, 15, 22, 27, 32, 36]), the hidden variable
λ corresponds to our z ∈ XZ rather than x ∈ X. It is the distinction between XZ and
the ‘super-deterministic’ state space X that allowed us to give a consistent formulation of
Determinism without jeopardizing Freedom. As shown above, this eventually enables one
to treat the apparatus settings as parameters rather than as random variables.
12This is true even if F = F (A,B,Z) and G = G(A,B,Z) rather than F = F (A,Z) and G = G(B,Z).
4
3 Bell’s (1964) Theorem for spin-one
The Free Will Theorem relies on a variation of the epr-Bohm experiment in which C2 is
replaced by C3; specifically, photons with the helicity degree of freedom only (or electrons
with spin only) are replaced by massive spin-one particles. Although such a ‘Free Will
Experiment’ has never been performed (though it might be, one day), quantum mechan-
ics gives unambiguous predictions that may be used in lieu of measurement outcomes.
Compared to the set-up of the previous section, the following changes are to be made:
• The settings are now given by A = a and B = b, where a = [~a1,~a2,~a3] and b =
[~b1,~b2,~b3] are frames in R
3, that is, orthonormal bases (~a1,~a2,~a3) etc. in which each
unit vector is defined up to a minus sign so that, e.g., [−~a1,~a2,−~a3] = [~a1,~a2,~a3].
• The outcomes are now given by F = λ ∈ XF , G = µ ∈ XG, where
XF = XG = {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)}. (3.11)
• If we write F = (F1, F2, F3) and G = (G1, G2, G3), so that e.g. F = (1, 1, 0) cor-
responds to F1 = F2 = 1, F3 = 0, the relevant outcome of the experiment in the
epr-state (defined in terms of the usual spin-1 basis (|0〉, | ± 1〉) of C3)
|ψepr〉 = (| − 1〉| − 1〉+ |0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉)/
√
3, (3.12)
at least as predicted by quantum mechanics,13 is given by14
PQM (Fi 6= Gj |A = a, B = b) = 23 sin2 θ~ai,~bj (i, j = 1, 2, 3). (3.13)
Here θ
~a,~b
is the angle between ~a and ~b, so that cos2 θ
~a,~b
= 〈~a,~b〉2, cf. (2.1). Note that
the right-hand side only depends on (~ai,~bj) rather than on all six vectors (a,b).
Along the same lines as Theorem 2.2, and subject to analogous definitions,15 one proves:
Theorem 3.1 Determinism, Probability Theory, Parameter Independence, Freedom, and
Nature (i.e. the outcome (3.13) of the Free Will Experiment) are contradictory.
For future reference, we also record the following consequence of (3.13):16
PQM (Fi = Gj|Ai = Bj) = 1. (3.14)
In other words, if the settings (a,b) have ~ai = ±~bj , then with probability one the mea-
surements Fi and Gj have the same outcomes (i.e. either Fi = Gj = 0 or Fi = Gj = 1).
13What is being measured here by say Alice with setting a is the triple (〈~a1, ~J〉
2, 〈~a2, ~J〉
2, 〈~a3, ~J〉
2), where
~J is the angular momentum operator for spin one. Each operator 〈~ai, ~J〉 has spectrum {−1, 0, 1}, so each
square 〈~ai, ~J〉
2 can be 0 or 1. Since ~J2 = 2, one has 〈~a1, ~J〉
2 + 〈~a2, ~J〉
2 + 〈~a3, ~J〉
2 = 2, which gives (3.11).
14 The complete (theoretical) statistics are: PQM (Fi = 1, Gj = 1|A = a, B = b) =
1
3
(1 + 〈~ai,~bj〉
2),
PQM (Fi = 0, Gj = 0|A = a, B = b) =
1
3
〈~ai,~bj〉
2, PQM (Fi = 1, Gj = 0|A = a, B = b) =
1
3
(1 − 〈~ai,~bj〉
2),
and PQM (Fi = 0, Gj = 1|A = a, B = b) =
1
3
(1− 〈~ai,~bj〉
2). See footnote 8 for notation like P (Fi 6= Gj |·).
15See Definition 4.1 below for Determinism, and Definition 2.1 for the others, mutatis mutandis.
16Here PQM (Fi = Gj |Ai = Bj) denotes PQM (Fi = 0, Gj = 0|Ai = Bj) + PQM (Fi = 1, Gj = 1|Ai = Bj),
where the setting Ai = Bj stands for (A = a, B = b) subject to ~ai = ±~bj . It follows from (3.13) or the
previous footnote that PQM (Fi = Gj |Ai = Bj) =
1
3
(1 + 2 cos2 θ~ai,~bj ), which for ~ai = ±
~bj equals unity.
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4 The Strong Free Will Theorem revisited
The Strong Free Will Theorem [14] historically arose as a refinement of the Kochen–
Specker Theorem [4, 25], in which the assumption of Non-contextuality in a single-wing
experiment on a (massive) spin-one particle was replaced by the assumption of Parameter
Independence in the double-wing experiment described in the previous section. In turn,
the Kochen–Specker Theorem (like Gleason’s Theorem, from which it follows) freed von
Neumann’s no-go result for hidden variable theories [28] from its controversial linearity
assumption (see [9] for a balanced discussion). Thus the Strong Free Will Theorem of 2009
may be seen as a finishing touch of the development started by von Neumann in 1932.
Ironically, we are now going to place the Strong Free Will Theorem in the Bell tradition,
which emphatically arose in opposition (if not hostility) to the work of von Neumann!
Roughly speaking, the Strong Free Will Theorem removes the assumption of Probabil-
ity Theory from Bell’s (1964) Theorem (in our spin-one version, i.e., Theorem 3.1), but in
order to achieve this, some of the assumptions now acquire a somewhat different meaning.
Definition 4.1 In the context of the Free Will Experiment of the previous section:
• Determinism means that there is a state space X with associated functions
A : X → XA, B : X → XB , F : X → XF , G : X → XG,
where XA = XB is the set of all frames in R
3, and XF = XG is given by (3.11), which
completely describe the experiment in the sense that each state x ∈ X determines
both its settings a = A(x),b = B(x) and its outcome λ = F (x), µ = G(x).
Furthermore, in terms of a postulated additional random variable Z : X → XZ :
• Parameter Independence means that F = F (A,Z) and G = G(B,Z), i.e., for
all x ∈ X one has F (x) = Fˆ (A(x), Z(x)) and G(x) = Gˆ(B(x), Z(x)) for certain
functions Fˆ : XA ×XZ → XF , Gˆ : XB ×XZ → XG.
• Freedom means that (A,B,Z) are independent in the sense that for each (a,b, z) ∈
XA ×XB ×XZ there is an x ∈ X for which A(x) = a, B(x) = b, and Z(x) = z.
Thus the main change lies in the Freedom assumption, which simply says that the function
A × B × Z : X → XA × XB × XZ , x 7→ (A(x), B(x), Z(x)), is surjective. The goal of
this assumption is to remove any potential dependencies between (or constraints on) the
variables (a,b, z), and hence between the physical system Alice and Bob perform their
measurements on, and the devices they perform their measurements with.
Also, rather than the probabilistic outcome (3.13) of the Free Will Experiment, we
use its corollary (3.14), construed non-probabilistically (i.e., probability one is replaced by
deterministic certainty): writing Fˆ = (Fˆ1, Fˆ2, Fˆ3) and Gˆ = (Gˆ1, Gˆ2, Gˆ3), analogous to F
and G, so that Fˆi : XA ×XZ → {0, 1} and Gˆj : XB ×XZ → {0, 1}, Nature reveals that:17
~ai = ~bj ⇒ Fˆi(~a1,~a2,~a3, z) = Gˆj(~b1,~b2,~b3, z). (4.15)
Our reformulation of the Strong Free Will Theorem [7, 11, 14, 20, 34], then, is as follows.
Theorem 4.2 Determinism, Parameter Independence, Freedom, and Nature (here repre-
sented by the outcome (4.15) of the Free Will Experiment) are contradictory.
17To keep matters simple, we will not be bothered with the notational difference between frames
[~a1,~a2,~a3] and orthonormal bases (~a1,~a2,~a3), and similarly for b, until the end of the proof.
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Proof. The Freedom assumption allows us to treat (a,b, z) as free variables, a fact
that will tacitly be used all the time. First, take i = j in (4.15). This shows that
Fˆi(~a1,~a2,~a3, z) only depends on (~ai, z), whilst Gˆj(~b1,~b2,~b3, z) only depends on (~bj , z).
Hence we write Fˆi(~a1,~a2,~a3, z) = F˜i(~ai, z), etc. Next, taking i 6= j in (4.15) shows that
F˜1(~a, z) = F˜2(~a, z) = F˜3(~a, z). Consequently, the function Fˆ : XA×XZ → XF is given by
Fˆ (~a1,~a2,~a3, z) = (F˜ (~a1, z), F˜ (~a2, z), F˜ (~a3, z)), (4.16)
Combined with its value set (3.11), this shows that for each fixed z, Fˆ is a frame function:
to each frame a it assigns one of the triples in (3.11), in such a way that if two different
frames a and a′ overlap in that ~a′i = ~aj for some i, j, then Fˆi(~a
′
i, z) = Fˆj(~aj , z). However,
such a function does not exist by the Kochen–Specker Theorem [25, 30]. 
Through the proof of the Kochen–Specker Theorem, this proof shows that a suitable finite
set of frames will do for XA = XB , a simplification that is not available in Theorem 3.1!
5 Bell’s Theorem revisited
To close, we show that what is usually called Bell’s Theorem [6, 8, 10, 15, 22, 27, 32, 36],
in which Determinism is not assumed, may also be reformulated using our treatment of
apparatus settings as random variables. We restrict ourselves to generalizing Theorem
2.2; Theorem 3.1 may be adapted to stochastic hidden variables in an analogous way.
Definition 5.1 In the context of the epr-Bohm experiment (with photons):
• Probability Theory means that there is a probability space (X,Σ, P ), carrying ran-
dom variables (2.2), so that the empirical probabilities are reproduced as conditional
joint probabilities through (2.3).
• Bell-Locality means that there is a fifth random variable Z : X → XZ for which
P (F = λ,G = µ|A = α,B = β,Z = z) = (5.17)
P (F = λ|A = α,Z = z) · P (G = µ|B = β,Z = z). (5.18)
• Freedom means that, for this fifth variable, P (Z = z|A = α,B = β) = P (Z = z).
Theorem 5.2 Probability Theory, Bell-Locality, Freedom, and Nature are contradictory,
where Nature is represented through the outcome (2.1) of the epr-Bohm experiment.
Proof. Introduce a new probability space X˜Z = [0, 1]× [0, 1]×XZ , with elements (s, t, z),
and probability measure dP˜Z(s, t, z) = ds · dt · dPZ(z). On X˜Z , define random variables
F˜α(s, t, z) = χ[0,P (F=1|A=α,Z=z)](s); (5.19)
G˜β(s, t, z) = χ[0,P (G=1|B=β,Z=z)](t), (5.20)
a move inspired by [36]. Using all assumptions of the theorem, one then finds
P (F = λ,G = µ|A = α,B = β) = P˜Z(F˜α = λ, G˜β = µ), (5.21)
cf. (2.8), so that the proof may be completed exactly as in the case of Theorem 2.2. 
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